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This analysis presents what we 
know about the provision of 
medically inappropriate and 
unnecessary services that drive up 
health care spending without 
making a positive impact on 
patients’ health outcomes. It also 
describes approaches that have 
already been used to address this 
issue—with limited success. We 
suggest that broader payment 
reforms are needed to minimize 
incentives to overdiagnose and 
overtreat and to better support the 
other approaches.  
Introduction 
The United States is an outlier in 
terms of its per capita spending on 
health care, surpassing other 
developed countries by a 
considerable margin. High prices 
and fees in the U.S. health sector 
have been identified as important 
drivers of these spending variations. 
The complexity and fragmentation 
of our system also plays a role in 
generating higher-than-average 
administrative costs and in creating 
an environment in which waste, 
fraud, and abuse can thrive.1 
The volume and mix of health care 
services provided in the United 
States also play a role in explaining 
higher health spending, although the 
story is complicated. By many 
measures of service volume, the 
United States is not an outlier. In 
fact, we have fewer physician visits, 
fewer hospital admissions, and 
shorter lengths of stay in 
comparison with many developed 
countries.2 According to many 
indicators of preventive service use, 
U.S. performance is only average or 
below average.3 But there are 
certain areas, including some 
relatively high-tech and high-cost 
services such as imaging and 
cardiac surgery, where the United 
States appears among the most 
prolific users.4  
Extrapolating from studies focusing 
on particular conditions or services, 
some analysts have estimated that as 
much as a third of U.S. health care 
spending is unnecessary and 
wasteful.5 This estimate includes 
the provision of medical services 
and the prescription of medicines 
that are medically inappropriate—in 
other words, health care from which 
the patient derives no medical 
benefit or for which the potential 
harms exceed the potential benefits. 
More than a quarter of all wasteful 
spending in health care—an 
estimated $210 billion out of $765 
billion in wasteful spending in 
2009—is attributed to overuse of 
services that are medically 
inappropriate or otherwise 
unnecessary, which includes 
services that are provided more 
frequently than warranted and 
higher-cost services that are no 
better than lower-cost alternatives.6  
 
There is variation in the level of 
inappropriate use by type of service, 
and it is evident that some services 
are subject to a great deal of 
overprovision. A recent review of 
the research literature found rates at 
which particular therapeutic 
procedures, tests, or medications 
were performed or prescribed when 
clinically inappropriate ranged from 
a low of 1 percent to a high of 89 
percent.7 For example, a 2007 study 
found that 60.8 percent of colon 
cancer screenings undertaken were 
medically inappropriate, while a 
2005 study found that 27 percent of 
physical therapy prescriptions for 
low back pain did not meet 
threshold standards for appropriate 
service use.  
While any overuse of services 
drives up spending, inappropriate 
service use is particularly important 
because it has the potential to harm 
patients. One in every four patients 
admitted to the hospital is 
prescribed an inappropriate 
medicine, sometimes leading to 
adverse drug reactions that are 
responsible for 20 percent of 
inpatient deaths.8 Other examples of 
harmful overuse include radiation 
exposure from imaging scans such 
as CT scans, elective C-sections 
performed for convenience, and 
prescribing aggressive treatment 
options to those with terminal 
illnesses without disclosing the 
likely futility of such interventions. 
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Reducing the overuse of just seven 
services known to be subject to high 
rates of inappropriate use could save 
between $33 billion and $62 billion 
annually.9  
The potential of achieving cost 
reductions while substantially 
improving health care quality and 
outcomes can only tantalize policy-
makers in this era of rapidly rising 
health spending and very strong 
constraints on the financing side. 
Meanwhile, current support for 
experimentation with new forms of 
health service delivery and 
concurrent changes in payment and 
regulatory oversight make the 
present a most opportune moment in 
which to consider the prospects for 
ensuring that those changes help, 
rather than hinder, efforts to reduce 
inappropriate service use. 
This analysis focuses on what we 
know about the provision of 
medically inappropriate and other 
unnecessary services, which drive 
up health spending without making 
a positive impact on the health 
outcomes of patients. We begin by 
reviewing the literature on the 
extent of medically inappropriate 
overuse, continue by describing 
approaches used to tackle 
inappropriate service use, and then 
discuss the implications of current 
and proposed provider payment 
methods on the provision of 
inappropriate services and in 
spurring excess volume of services. 
In the review of payment 
approaches, we discuss 
opportunities to modify the various 
payment methods to address the 
provision of medically inappropriate 
services and overuse of unnecessary 
services, as more broadly construed.  
 
What do we know about 
inappropriate service 
use? 
Although inappropriate service use 
has been studied by researchers 
since at least the late 1970s, 
measuring it is technically 
challenging and costly. As a result, 
there is still a lot we do not know 
about its incidence and the reasons 
for its persistence. Despite the 
limited evidence base, the evidence 
that we do have suggests that there 
is a great deal of costly overuse of 
services that has defied efforts to 
address the problem. The problem is 
difficult to study for reasons 
discussed below, and those same 
reasons also make implementing 
policies to tackle the problem 
difficult. 
What has the research shown?  
After reviewing the research 
literature on inappropriate services, 
Korenstein and colleagues 
uncovered 172 articles measuring 
overuse that were published 
between 1978 and 2009 and met 
minimum quality standards in terms 
of methodology and other criteria.10 
Of these, 53 articles addressed 
therapeutic procedures, 38 
concerned diagnostic tests, and 81 
pertained to medications. Within 
each area, a relatively small number 
of procedures, tests, and medicines 
had been studied. For example, 59 
studies (more than one-third of the 
total) addressed antibiotics for 
upper respiratory tract infections, 17 
studies looked at coronary 
angiography, and 7 studies 
investigated use of upper 
endoscopy. In sum, only 18 unique 
therapeutic procedures, 24 
diagnostic tests, and 13 medications 
were evaluated in terms of the 
incidence of inappropriate use. 
Based upon their findings, 
Korenstein and colleagues 
concluded that inappropriate use is 
often a problem for the services 
included in the published articles, 
although there is wide variation in 
rates of overuse documented by the 
research. At the same time, for the 
vast majority of procedures, tests, 
and medications in use today, no 
studies have assessed the extent to 
which they are overused in practice. 
Because of limitations in the scope 
of the research, there are important 
gaps in our understanding that limit 
opportunities to reduce health care 
spending without adversely 
affecting public health. 
The review demonstrated that new 
and costly procedures were 
particularly underrepresented in the 
research literature.11 In part, this 
dearth is explained by shortfalls in 
comparative effectiveness research 
for many services, particularly new 
ones. Filling these gaps in the 
evidence base would need to be 
prioritized if this research is to serve 
as a resource for targeting potential 
opportunities for enhancing the 
cost-efficiency of spending on 
health care services. 
Certain services, including 
antibiotic use and several coronary 
procedures, have been subject to 
repeated study over time. For some 
of these services, such as carotid 
endarterectomy, the rate of 
inappropriate use has declined 
considerably.12 In the case of 
inappropriate antibiotic use, there is 
evidence of reductions in overuse, 
but a high level of overuse persists, 
despite significant outreach and 
education efforts. This finding 
indicates that publication of 
research documenting overuse is not 
necessarily sufficient to ensure 
changes in practice patterns. 
 Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues  3 
Why do we know so little about this 
critical aspect of health care 
quality?  
Korenstein and colleagues pointed 
to a number of reasons why 
inappropriate use of services is 
relatively less studied in comparison 
with underuse of medically 
appropriate services.13 Measuring 
overuse via the assessment of the 
rate of provision of medically 
inappropriate services is technically 
challenging. It requires defining 
circumstances in which a particular 
service is inappropriate for use with 
patients with certain characteristics 
or under certain circumstances, 
generally through a process that 
involves reviewing relevant 
scientific evidence and developing 
consensus of clinical experts to 
produce guidelines and performance 
standards. Furthermore, because 
administrative data sets lack the 
type of information and level of 
specificity required, assessing 
inappropriateness generally requires 
resource-intensive review of 
medical records. In addition to these 
technical considerations, 
identification of inappropriate use is 
controversial and sensitive, in part 
because there are often stakeholders 
with strong economic interest in 
defending a particular procedure or 
medication. This is the case with 
vertebroplasty, a surgical procedure 
on the spine that continues to be 
widely performed despite findings 
questioning its medical benefit.14  
For many services, if not most, 
measuring the extent to which they 
are subject to inappropriate use has 
not been attempted because of 
limited research dollars to support 
the effort, even though the pay-off 
might be far greater than the cost. 
Prominent gaps in scientific 
knowledge make the development 
of evidence-based standards 
difficult for many types of services, 
particularly ones that are relatively 
new or in use for new indications, 
and mean that practice standards 
may reflect differences in expert 
opinion where the science is 
unresolved. These standards require 
updating to be consistent with the 
current state of knowledge.15 For 
example, recent studies determined 
that the accepted practice of raising 
end-stage renal disease patients’ 
blood counts to levels that are 
normal in the general population 
lead to serious, unforeseen events 
such as heart attacks.16  
Further, for every indication in 
which use of a service can either be 
labeled clearly appropriate or 
inappropriate, there are many more 
for which the benefits are unknown, 
unclear, or uncertain, leaving 
physicians and patients to navigate a 
vast gray area by relying on some 
combination of judgment, instinct, 
experience, and tradition. This gray 
area stymies both health services 
researchers in their efforts to assess 
the prevalence of inappropriateness 
and health policy-makers in their 
efforts to target the problem for 
reduction. We also lack research on 
whether overuse of services varies 
by race or ethnicity, and we know 
little about the impact the overuse 
of services has on health care 
disparities.  
Although the issue of inappropriate 
overuse received significant 
research attention in the 1980s and 
1990s, the challenges inherent in 
this type of research have led to a 
shift toward more population-based 
studies, which demonstrate 
substantial geographic variations in 
service use without differences in 
outcomes.17 While there has been 
some recent renewal of interest in 
appropriateness research, its 
challenges, particularly the need to 
review detailed clinical information 
that is unavailable in administrative 
claims data, continue to limit its 
broad application.  
Do geographic areas where service 
use is relatively high have more 
inappropriate services?  
In a recently published review of 
the literature, Keyhani and 
colleagues identified only five 
studies addressing the question of 
whether geographic areas with high 
rates of service use had higher rates 
of inappropriate care. They 
concluded that the limited available 
evidence fails to support the 
hypothesis that inappropriate use of 
procedures is a major factor 
explaining geographic variations in 
intensity or cost of care.18 Most of 
the studies reviewed found that 
geographic areas with high rates of 
service use and areas with relatively 
low rates of service use had similar 
rates of inappropriate use of 
services.  
Work by researchers affiliated with 
the RAND Corporation has been 
very prominent in establishing the 
information base in this area.19 
Chassin and colleagues found that 
geographic areas where Medicare 
beneficiaries were 2.3 times more 
likely to receive a coronary 
angiography had only modestly 
higher rates of inappropriateness 
than was found in areas where use 
of the procedure was dramatically 
lower (82 percent versus 71 
percent). RAND work has also 
found that areas of the United States 
did not have higher rates of 
inappropriate service use than areas 
of Canada, despite having higher 
rates of provision of certain 
services.20  
While further research to explore 
the relationship between high 
volume and the rate of inappropriate 
service use is needed, the available 
evidence has certain implications 
for policy-makers. If it is true that 
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the rate of inappropriate service 
provision is similar across areas 
with different overall levels of 
service use, it is likely that the 
volume differential can be 
explained largely as a difference in 
use of so-called discretionary 
services—services with relatively 
low benefit-to-risk ratios (e.g., 
elective knee and hip replacements 
for arthritis) or with indications for 
use that are uncertain, including 
services for which provider and 
patient preferences play a decisive 
role. Thus, policy-makers could 
reduce incentives for provision of 
both inappropriate and discretionary 
services, as well as duplicative 
services reflecting poor care 
coordination or case management, 
to increase efficient use of resources 
and reduce cost pressure. 
Why does overuse of services 
persist?  
Possible reasons why overuse of 
inappropriate or unnecessary 
services persists in spite of some 
initiatives by policy-makers and 
health care administrators to target 
the problem include lags in the 
diffusion of new scientific evidence; 
incentives that promote overuse of 
services, including financial 
incentives (e.g., payment, 
ownership of equipment or 
practices), legal incentives (e.g., 
malpractice), and administrative 
incentives (e.g., quality standards); 
limitations in available measures 
and public reporting of information 
on appropriate use; patient demand, 
including demand that is fuelled by 
direct-to-consumer advertising of 
pharmaceuticals; professional and 
cultural biases that favor employing 
a treatment even if there is doubt as 
to its potential benefits; and the 
default standard in health care that 
an intervention is presumed 
effective until proven not to be in 
particular circumstances. Past 
efforts to impose standards of 
practice through managed care 
plans’ utilization review processes 
or even through public program 
coverage policies have met strong 
resistance from patients, medical 
professionals, and the drug and 
medical device industry 
stakeholders. 
Approaches used to 
tackle inappropriateness 
Efforts of policy-makers to tackle 
inappropriate service use have, to 
date, come up short. Below we 
discuss general approaches that 
have been tried, including 
monitoring, reporting, and efforts to 
affect demand and supply, and we 
consider why these efforts failed. 
Efforts to monitor the rates of 
provision of inappropriate services  
Although measurement of health 
care quality at the provider and 
health plan levels has become an 
increasingly common part of health 
care in the United States today, 
routine measurement of the rates of 
provision of inappropriate services 
is not a focus of these efforts. By 
one estimation, only four of the 39 
quality measures in the 2011 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and 
Information Set (HEDIS) of quality 
measures that are commonly used 
by payers and other parties to assess 
care quality explicitly address 
overuse.21  
One reason is that the determination 
of appropriateness requires review 
of clinical information, which 
generally cannot be ascertained 
from claims data. The result is that 
the few appropriateness measures 
that have been adopted do not 
require clinical information but 
rather can rely on demographic 
information that is available on 
claims. For example, recent 
guidelines call for cessation of 
screening colonoscopies in people 
over age 74. Because there are 
specific procedure codes that 
distinguish between screening and 
diagnostic colonoscopies, it is 
possible from claims data to 
calculate a rate of inappropriate 
screening colonoscopies for those 
over 74—anything over zero is 
inappropriate. Of course, this all-or-
nothing measure assumes that 
colonoscopies are coded correctly.  
Most of the time, the clinical 
information needed to establish an 
appropriateness measure is not 
available from claims data. This 
shortfall is important in that quality 
measurement is central to most 
efforts to set baseline standards and 
to motivate and ensure 
improvement in health care quality, 
through approaches such as 
informing patient choice and 
establishing administrative or 
regulatory rewards and sanctions. 
Efforts to educate physicians to 
comply with evidence of 
appropriateness  
Medical specialty societies, in an 
effort to fulfill their role of 
educating their members to stay 
current with the body of knowledge 
the public expects professionals to 
have at their command, have long 
devoted resources to develop 
evidence-based care guidelines, 
including identifying specific 
clinical indications for performing 
diagnostic and treatment 
interventions. Some, including the 
American College of Physicians, the 
American College of Cardiology, 
and the American College of 
Radiology, go further to identify 
clear contra-indications to 
performance of interventions—that 
is, to specify inappropriate use. 
Typically, the process of setting 
appropriateness criteria begins with 
a thorough literature review. But 
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since the available literature is 
usually not definitive in addressing 
all of the clinical variations that 
guidelines have to address, the 
review is followed by an expert 
consensus process to set the actual 
guidelines. Other entities, such as 
health insurance plans and 
authorities like the U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force, also develop 
evidence-based guidelines, which 
may provide advice about 
inappropriate use.  
Different users of evidence may 
come to somewhat different 
conclusions about the implications 
of the research findings on 
appropriateness of specific services, 
especially when the literature is not 
definitive. Payers, for example, are 
more likely to interpret the findings 
more strictly than providers, 
requiring a higher threshold of 
evidence to support use of a 
diagnostic or treatment intervention.  
There are many facets involved in a 
comprehensive appropriateness 
determination. For example, it may 
not be possible to determine how 
frequently a screening test should be 
performed, even if the screening test 
has been proven useful and 
appropriate. The result of these and 
other considerations is that there 
may be variation in criteria and in 
guidance about what constitutes 
inappropriate, as opposed to 
uncertain, use.  
Although physicians have a duty to 
adhere to the professional standards 
that evidence-based practice 
guidelines help establish, it is clear 
from the literature that 
professionalism and the efforts of 
professional societies have not 
succeeded in substantially reducing 
the provision of inappropriate 
services. To increase attention to the 
issue, nine specialty societies 
recently joined the American Board 
of Internal Medicine Foundation 
and Consumer Reports in the first 
phase of the Choosing Wisely 
campaign.22 Through this initiative, 
each society has developed a list of 
five tests, treatments, and services 
that are commonly used in that 
specialty and for which there was a 
judgment that the use was often not 
necessary for patients. Examples 
include unnecessary CT scans, 
antibiotics for an acute sinus 
infection, and stress imaging tests 
during annual checkups. All of 
these services were deemed to be 
provided at times when they offer 
no benefit to the patient or may 
actually cause harm. It remains to 
be seen if mounting a campaign to 
promote discussions between 
physicians and patients about the 
merits of particular interventions, 
rather than the more traditional 
approach of promulgating 
guidelines for physician use, proves 
more successful in reducing 
inappropriate service use.  
Efforts to affect demand for 
inappropriate services  
Prior to the recent launch of the 
Choosing Wisely campaign, efforts 
to activate patients to protect 
themselves against overuse have 
been negligible, with the exception 
of instituting cost-sharing 
arrangements that give patients 
incentives to limit their use of 
services. After studies of the impact 
of increased across-the-board cost 
sharing showed that patients tended 
to reduce use of both appropriate 
and inappropriate care,23 interest has 
grown in moving to value-based 
benefit designs in insurance 
policies. Value-based benefit 
designs increase cost-sharing for 
services of uncertain benefits and 
those prone to overuse (e.g., 
imaging), while reducing cost-
sharing for services that are viewed 
as high value under most patient 
circumstances (e.g., 
immunizations).  
Implementing value-based benefit 
designs that assign higher cost-
sharing rates to services of lower 
value has proved challenging. The 
value of an MRI, for example, 
depends on the specific clinical 
circumstances in which the scan is 
used. So it is one thing to believe 
that in aggregate there are many 
inappropriate MRIs being 
performed, but hard to define a 
policy to reduce inappropriate use 
as there are also many MRIs that are 
appropriate and even essential. 
There is no easy way to 
operationalize a priori a higher co-
payment (e.g., for the weekend 
athlete with knee discomfort), 
because of the discretion needed for 
individual cases.  
The relative sparseness of patient 
education and information 
campaigns focusing on the problem 
of overuse may reflect both market 
failures and conflicts of interest, 
although recent investments in areas 
such as comparative effectiveness 
research and informed shared 
decision-making may offer promise 
for the medium- and long-term 
future. However, it may require 
considerable effort to convince 
patients that more is not always 
better when it comes to service use, 
as recent controversies relating to 
new and more restrictive guidelines 
for appropriate use of breast and 
prostate cancer screenings have 
demonstrated. 
Efforts to use administrative levers 
to reduce inappropriate services  
The same methodological problems 
that make it difficult to study 
appropriateness also make it 
difficult to target policy remedies to 
this problem, particularly those that 
depend on defining standards and 
overseeing compliance with 
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evidence-based, clinical practice 
guidelines or criteria derived from 
such guidelines.  
Prior authorization, a process 
through which providers seek 
advance approval from a payer that 
the service will be paid for when 
provided to the patient, is the 
administrative approach most 
widely used by payers to try to 
reduce the provision of 
inappropriate services. The 
approach tries to address individual 
patients’ specific, clinical 
circumstances, usually not through 
full review of medical records but 
with review of the clinical 
information most relevant to the 
appropriateness of the clinical 
intervention requested.24 Based 
upon some early reports of success 
when used to assess the 
appropriateness of a patient’s 
proposed hospitalization,25 prior 
authorization was expanded to 
outpatient surgical procedures, and 
then again to routine ambulatory 
care referrals from one physician to 
another for fairly routine evaluation 
and management services.26 
However, its pervasive, often 
intrusive application made it ripe for 
criticism by physicians and patients, 
contributing to the managed care 
backlash. Health plans have 
retrenched and now apply prior 
authorization more selectively. 
Common applications include 
elective surgery, referral for 
advanced imaging (such as MRI and 
CT scans), and as part of the 
management of pharmaceutical 
formularies.  
When applied selectively to high-
cost, discretionary services where 
objective information can be 
reviewed by qualified third parties, 
prior authorization can play a role in 
reducing inappropriate services, 
although with less success for 
services for which actual benefits 
are uncertain or are believed to be 
minimal. Following reports of 
private health plans’ use of 
radiology benefit managers to 
review and approve requests for 
advanced imaging, the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission 
recently recommended the targeted 
application of prior authorization in 
Medicare for office-based referrals 
for advanced imaging.27  
Given the administrative complexity 
involved, the changing clinical 
evidence of what works and when, 
and the large amount of uncertainty 
in the gray area, prior 
authorization’s role in reducing 
inappropriate overuse is somewhat 
limited. Yet this form of utilization 
management can certainly 
complement other approaches 
addressing overuse.  
In summary, the various approaches 
described above either have not 
been used or have been used 
without much impact on reducing 
overutilization. Few quality 
measures exist to measure overuse, 
while patient education and 
information campaigns focusing on 
the problem of overuse have been 
half-hearted at best. Meanwhile, 
professional societies’ efforts to 
educate their members to reduce 
overuse are still fairly nascent and 
have yet to demonstrate a 
significant impact—to some extent 
because of the power of fee-for-
service incentives as described 
below. Prior authorization has been 
successful to limit overuse for 
particular clinical services but 
becomes intrusive and counter-
productive when used outside of its 
sweet spot.  
This reality suggests the need to 
rely more on payment incentives—
combined with investment in 
production and dissemination of 
evidence on what works under what 
circumstances—to influence clinical 
decisions and support efficient 
delivery that avoids overuse and 
reduces the use of services offering 
low benefits, relative to risks, rather 
than on approaches that rely on 
measurement of inappropriate 
services or enforcing adherence to 
standards. 
How payment methods 
affect overuse 
Although research on the effects of 
payment methods on volume of 
services has demonstrated that fee-
for-service tends to incentivize 
more use of services than does 
capitation,28 the recent research 
literature is surprisingly sparse on 
the question of how payment 
methods affect the provision of 
inappropriate services.  
One recent study found evidence to 
suggest that physicians who were 
paid on the basis of capitation were 
less likely to indicate that they 
would provide discretionary 
services, as compared with 
physicians who were paid fee-for-
service.29 This study’s findings are 
consistent with the broad 
perceptions that fee-for-service 
rewards not only more service use 
but also excessive volume of 
services, including both 
unnecessary and inappropriate 
services, and are supported by 
observed anecdotal examples of real 
medical practice phenomena. For 
example, the abusive overdosing of 
the anti-anemia drug erythropoietin 
to raise blood counts took place 
under generous fee-for-service 
payments. The practice ceased 
immediately when the drugs were 
bundled into the dialysis payment, 
because payments were fixed 
regardless of whether and how 
much of the erythropoietin drugs 
were used.30  
 Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues  7 
Studies that have attempted to 
establish a relationship between 
payment method and service use, 
whether inappropriate or not, are 
challenging because many 
accompanying characteristics of a 
payment method impact clinical 
decision-making.31 Of course the 
generosity of the payment could 
influence provider behavior. For 
example, under capitation, a low 
payment level considered 
inadequate by physicians might lead 
to stinting on services and altered 
referral patterns, whereas higher 
payments might not. But the context 
in which the payment method 
applies should also strongly affect 
clinician decision-making; the 
particular culture of the provider 
organization in which the clinician 
practices can cause any particular 
payment method to behave 
differently.  
As the following discussion makes 
clear, provider responses to 
payment incentives can be quite 
nuanced. Understanding those 
nuances can help design payment 
approaches that would address the 
problem of unneeded services and 
possibly the provision of 
inappropriate services—especially 
the provision of care in the gray 
area that lacks evidence-based 
guidelines and prior authorization 
rules. There, payment incentives 
can play an important role in 
influencing decisions, for better or 
worse. We next review some basic 
issues in how commonly used and 
proposed payment approaches can 
affect the volume of services in 
general and inappropriate overuse in 
particular. 
Fee-for-service 
There is a growing consensus that 
fee-for-service represents payment 
for volume, regardless of 
appropriateness, and needs to be 
replaced. However, how physicians 
respond to fee-for-service incentives 
depends on whether or not a 
particular service is included for 
payment in the fee schedule and on 
how profitable particular services 
are. A growing body of evidence 
has documented excesses associated 
with current fee-for-service practice, 
including abusing physician self-
referral of imaging and other 
noninvasive office testing, selecting 
the highest cost (and most 
profitable) intervention for 
treatment of prostate cancer, and 
performing inappropriate major 
spine surgery on patients with 
chronic low back pain.32 Again, 
while the literature does not actually 
document that inappropriate 
services occur more commonly in 
fee-for-service than in capitated or 
salaried practice, it is clear that at 
least some physician self-referral 
behavior would be financially self-
defeating without fee-for-service.  
The precise fee levels for specific 
services can also play a role in 
incentivizing overuse of particular 
services. Longstanding research has 
shown that physicians respond to 
reductions in fees by increasing the 
services affected by the payment 
reductions. In the context of the 
Medicare Fee Schedule, CMS 
actuaries have calculated a 
behavioral offset to partly account 
for expected volume increases that 
physicians generate in response to 
fee reductions or freezes.33 
However, other research, some 
quite recent, suggests that 
physicians in fact respond to fees 
more like other economic actors do. 
That is, if a service becomes less 
profitable, the incentive to produce 
it declines.34  
In short, the physician response to 
fee-for-service payment levels is 
actually not so simple, as well 
summarized in the title of a recent 
issue brief on the topic, “Expect the 
Unexpected? Physician Responses 
to Payment Changes.” From their 
reading of the accumulating 
evidence, the authors argue that 
cutting fees leads to higher 
utilization when the targeted 
services account for a large share of 
physician income.35 However, if the 
services involved do not account for 
substantial income, physicians 
reduce their output of the services 
whose fees were cut, plausibly 
reducing both appropriate and 
inappropriate services.i  
In the Medicare Fee Schedule, 
payments for services such as test 
and imaging interpretations and 
minor procedures often far exceed 
the resource costs, making them 
highly profitable and, therefore, 
provided to excess. Other services 
and patient care activities that are 
uncompensated or relatively poorly 
paid, such as engaging in care 
                                                          
i In the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 
Congress decided to pay physician practices 
for imaging services no more than what is paid 
to hospital outpatient departments. Fees were 
reduced significantly, as much as 40 percent 
for a common MRI of the brain. As the 
Government Accountability Office 
documented in the first year with the reduced 
fees, the approach generated first-year savings 
of 13 percent for the affected imaging services, 
largely from the direct reduction in prices paid. 
(See: Trends in Fees, Utilization, and 
Expenditures for Imaging Services before and 
after Implementation of the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005. Washington: Government 
Accountability Office, 2008, 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1102R.) The 
volume of the affected services continued to 
rise but at a lower rate than in the most recent 
prior years. There was no behavioral response 
to make up for pay reductions with volume. 
Now, years later, the volume of imaging 
services paid for under the Medicare fee 
schedule has flattened out, albeit still at a high 
level with many, presumably unneeded, 
inappropriate services. The point is that even 
fee-for-service can be modified to reduce 
provision of volume, some of which likely 
represents inappropriate overuse. 
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planning activities and phone 
consultations, are not prone to 
overuse. These distortions are not 
inevitable, although there are 
inherent practical and political 
challenges in getting administered 
prices correct.  
Episodes and bundled episodes  
The episode-based payment 
approach involves a single payment 
covering all services provided over 
a defined period of time. In this 
discussion, we distinguish episodes 
from bundled episodes, since 
bundling implies merging payment 
streams that had previously been 
paid separately to different 
providers. In the case of Medicare’s 
diagnosis-related group (DRG) 
payments, which are a form of 
episode-based payment, the period 
of time for a hospitalization is from 
one to three days prior to admission 
through the hospital discharge. In 
Maryland, which runs an all-payer 
rate-setting program for hospitals, 
the period of time covered by a 
single payment to the hospital has 
been extended to 30 days post-
discharge for many diagnoses.36 
Another common example of an 
episode payment is the global 
payment made to surgeons for 
major surgery. The single fee-for-
service payment covers the cost of 
the actual operation and routine 
post-operative care for up to 90 
days after surgery.  
The theoretical merit of paying for 
an episode of care is that the 
payment amount is fixed, regardless 
of the quantity and mix of services 
actually provided inside the episode 
period. The costs of care are 
internalized to the providers, who 
essentially are at financial risk for 
spending inside the episode, though 
exceptions are made for outlier 
cases. This means that the basic 
incentive for providers is to provide 
a large number of efficiently 
provided episodes.  
With episode-based payment, the 
behavioral response differs for 
discretionary and nondiscretionary 
services. As a general rule, 
providers cannot induce demand for 
maternity care or treatment of a 
fractured femur—they are 
nondiscretionary. Yet, providers can 
and do induce demand for 
discretionary services, such as those 
found in the appropriateness 
literature review cited earlier, 
including joint replacements, heart 
and large vessel procedures, spine 
surgery, and deliveries by Cesarean 
section.37  
The concern is that with episode-
based payment, discretionary 
services will increase in volume—
sometimes representing 
inappropriate overuse—offsetting 
the savings achieved by 
internalizing the costs of producing 
the services to the provider. In 
short, some inappropriate services 
will decrease and others—the 
interventions that create the 
episode—might increase.  
Bundled episodes. With bundled 
episode-based payments, where the 
various payment streams to 
different providers are merged into 
one, the bundling can be actual (i.e., 
a single payment is made to a 
recipient provider who then is 
responsible for distributing it to the 
constituent providers who provide 
services inside the bundled episode) 
or it can be virtual (i.e., the separate 
payments continue but with an 
accounting of how much the actual 
payment distributions varied from 
the target payment amount for the 
bundled episode, as the basis for 
determining surpluses or deficits, 
which become the responsibility of 
the bundled entity). Only if costs are 
less than the bundled episode 
payment level does one have to 
worry about distribution of 
surpluses to the various parties 
providing care in the bundled 
episodes.  
The reason for the virtual approach 
is that maintenance of traditional 
fee-for-service claims and payments 
is viewed by many as operationally 
and politically easier for providers 
to manage and accept. However, 
this approach may have negative 
consequences on provider behavior 
to generate inappropriate services.  
The objective of bundling is to 
break down provider silos to 
promote more cooperation and 
coordination among the various 
providers that deliver care. A major 
challenge in this approach is that 
bundling across providers is 
operationally difficult.38 Indeed, 
many consider it much more 
challenging administratively than 
capitation.  
Our interest here is in how bundled 
episodes address the problem of 
inappropriate overuse of services, 
particularly discretionary 
procedures. It is notable that some 
analysts have not even raised the 
concern that bundled episodes have 
fee-for-service-like incentives for 
generating unneeded services.39 
There is an apparent assumption 
that incentives for overprovision of 
interventions when paid with 
bundled episodes (i.e., up-coding to 
claim payment for a more complex 
episode) are no worse than the 
incentives to prescribe unnecessary 
services within fee-for-service. For 
example, a recent projection of 
substantial Medicare savings under 
a regime of bundled episode 
payments did not consider the 
possibility that the volume of 
bundles could be different from that 
under the baseline, fee-for-service 
use patterns.40  
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Although there is little evidence one 
way or the other, given the rare 
application of bundled episode 
payments to date, a plausible 
argument can be advanced that 
bringing providers together to 
collaborate on care for specific 
acute care episodes could actually 
increase volume to levels that could 
counteract any spending reductions 
from the new internalized incentives 
to reduce the cost of the bundled 
episode. Hospitals and specialists 
can brand and market service lines 
with the hope of attracting patients 
from other providers and creating 
new demand for the service line 
product. Such a strategy produces 
non-price competition that raises 
costs by increasing demand for 
technically oriented interventions, 
thereby contributing to a “medical 
arms race.”41 In the last decade, 
hospitals have done just this—
developing and marketing profitable 
service lines by closely affiliating 
with specialist physicians essential 
to hospitals’ service line products.42  
Ultimately, whether bundled 
episode payments raise the volume 
of inappropriate services even more 
than under straight fee-for-service 
will be determined empirically. The 
Innovation Center at CMS and some 
private health insurers have begun 
experiments with bundled episodes, 
mostly involving hospitalization for 
an acute condition involving a 
procedure. Those tests will help tell 
us whether the incentives of 
bundled episodes reduce 
discretionary services within 
episodes and whether they increase 
the number of episodes.ii Whether 
                                                          
ii In 2009, CMS began implementing the acute 
care episode demonstration of bundled 
payments for physician and hospital services 
furnished to patients as part of hip and knee 
replacements and cardiac procedures. In its 
early results, Hillcrest Medical Center in Tulsa 
reported cost savings, especially from 
increased bargaining power for equipment and 
those changes involve a decrease or 
increase in inappropriate services 
would need to be separately 
assessed through medical record 
review. Further, it is possible that 
some of the approaches cited 
earlier, such as requiring prior 
authorization, adherence to 
evidence-based appropriateness 
criteria, or shared decision-making 
with patient decision aids43 could be 
used to constrain further overuse of 
the bundled episodes for which 
payment is claimed. 
Pay-for-performance  
As is true with other types of quality 
problems (e.g., underuse) the 
potential for using pay-for-
performance methods to discourage 
the provision of inappropriate and 
unnecessary services is limited by 
accountability issues. As noted 
above, there are very few measures 
of appropriateness in current use. 
This is not for lack of interest. 
Rather, there are inherent 
limitations in being able to develop 
valid measures relying on 
administrative data sources in a fee-
for-service payment environment. 
For the most part, individual 
patients are not assigned or formally 
associated with particular practices 
or delivery systems, so there is no 
relevant population denominator on 
which to establish norms for rates of 
services provided.  
There may be some ability to relate 
rates of one service to another. For 
example, the Maryland Health 
Services Cost Review Commission 
                                                                 
supplies as physicians and the hospital 
consolidated their negotiations with vendors. 
At the same time, Hillcrest reported about 30 
percent increases in volume for the orthopedic 
and cardiac procedures. Whether that large 
volume increase represents redistribution of 
cases from other facilities or increased total 
interventions for beneficiaries in the area 
remains to be determined. (See endnote 27.) 
is measuring the rate of stent 
placement to coronary 
catheterizations to try to identify 
inappropriate overuse of coronary 
artery stent placement. In this case, 
the denominator in calculating 
comparative rates is not the 
population served (information that 
is not available from claims data), 
but rather the population of patients 
who have undergone a cardiac 
catheterization (data that is derived 
from claims). Yet, this creative 
ratio-based attempt to identify 
overuse is the exception that proves 
the rule. Namely, in the absence of a 
population denominator, 
performance rates as the foundation 
for measuring appropriate provision 
of services generally are not 
available. Further, even if there 
were a population denominator, it 
would still be necessary to do case-
mix adjustment for the population’s 
health status, another challenging 
requirement. 
Also, without a population 
denominator, one could still try to 
measure the rate of performance of 
particular services in relation to 
clinical indications for that patient. 
But as noted earlier, claims data 
used to assess performance 
generally lack the clinical 
information needed to permit an 
accurate assessment of 
appropriateness.  
The challenge of accounting for 
variations in provision of 
discretionary services was well 
captured in an article reviewing the 
difficulties of basing payment 
policy on measurement of spending 
and health outcomes. The article 
noted: “Hospital performance 
measurement will be most biased if 
the decision to admit varies 
systematically across hospitals and 
regions. Such variation may reflect 
greater illness levels in the 
population. However, higher 
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utilization also may be due to a 
lower threshold for admission, 
driven for example by higher per 
capita supply of physicians and 
hospital beds. In such hospitals, 
sufficient slack capacity allows 
physicians to work ‘down an 
appropriateness curve’ in their 
admission decisions” [emphasis 
added].44 The stated implication is 
that unless one can account for 
different appropriateness thresholds 
for admission, measures of hospital 
spending and quality outcomes are 
likely to be inaccurate.45 
Shared savings and global payment 
Global payment or global capitation 
is a population-based payment 
approach in which a fixed per-
person, per-month prospective 
payment is made to an organization 
responsible for providing services to 
individuals who elect or are 
assigned to receive care from the 
providers in that organization. With 
global capitation payment (in 
contrast to primary care and 
professional capitation), most of the 
services that comprise the payer’s 
benefit package are included in the 
global payment. Sometimes 
prescription drugs, mental health 
benefits, and other specialized 
benefits may be carved out of the 
global payment.  
Global capitation is the payment 
model that most fundamentally 
changes fee-for-service incentives 
that reward provision of 
inappropriate services. Simply put, 
unneeded procedures and hospital 
stays constitute what financial 
officers call “profit centers” under 
fee-for-service and its variations, 
whereas they are “cost centers” 
under global payment. In contrast to 
episode-based payment, under 
global payment there is no 
distinction between services that 
create an episode (and are therefore 
financially desirable) and those that 
take place within an episode (and 
are therefore financially 
undesirable). In short, global 
capitation penalizes volume of 
services, whether appropriate or not. 
Indeed, a major policy concern is 
that organizations and their 
constituent members will 
underserve patients because the 
incentives are too strong in the 
opposite direction from fee-for-
service. This concern has led to 
proposals to mix fee-for-service and 
capitation to try to balance 
incentives (i.e., partial capitation)46 
or to adopt other approaches that 
mitigate the extent of financial risk, 
softening the incentives to withhold 
needed services without eliminating 
the incentive to economize that is 
inherent in global payment. 
Adherence to professional standards 
is supposed to serve as an important 
brake on some amount of 
inappropriate underuse just as it 
surely restrains some overuse under 
fee-for-service. Further, the clinical 
domains with the greatest number of 
valid clinical quality measures are 
in the area of primary and 
secondary prevention, permitting a 
complementary use of global 
payment and performance measures 
to detect some underuse. 
Unfortunately, there are not good 
measures to detect underuse at the 
other end—for patients with serious 
health problems. For example, some 
patients might be best served with 
referral to clinicians and/or facilities 
that are not part of the provider 
network receiving the capitated 
payment. However, we cannot 
easily measure the failure to make 
an appropriate referral.  
Shared savings. Shared savings 
within an accountable care 
organization (ACO) is being 
promoted as a possible transition 
approach for organizations seeking 
to move from fee-for-service but are 
not willing or able to make the 
move to global or even partial 
capitation. Under the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program that was 
created by the Affordable Care Act, 
initially fee-for-service to the 
constituent provider members of the 
ACO will continue according to 
existing Medicare payment rules, 
i.e., fees to physicians and 
diagnosis-related group payments 
for inpatient hospitalization. At the 
end of an accounting period, the 
actual spending attributed to the 
ACO is compared to a target 
spending amount, with any 
surpluses split between Medicare 
and the ACO. The ACO is 
responsible for determining how 
surpluses (savings to Medicare) will 
be distributed among the members 
of the ACO.  
In this one-sided risk approach, and 
in contrast to global payment, there 
is no financial penalty if actual 
spending turns out to be more than 
the target amount. In the Shared 
Savings Program, there is also an 
option for ACOs to assume two-
sided risk, an approach that would 
be required by year four of the 
program. With two-sided risk, both 
surpluses and deficits would be 
shared with Medicare. This two-
sided approach starts on the road to 
global payment in that the marginal 
incentive for the organization is to 
reduce volume.  
However, in considering shared 
savings to ACOs under the CMS 
program, one needs to recognize 
that the incentives for the ACO and 
those for the ACO’s constituent 
providers might be quite different, 
as in the case of managed care 
organizations and their provider 
network constituents. Cash flow to 
the constituent providers continues 
based on fee-for-service. So for a 
specialist achieving high incomes 
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by doing discretionary procedures 
or a hospital trying to keep beds 
occupied by generating additional 
admissions, the financial incentive 
to generate volume far exceeds the 
incentive to share in possible 
savings achieved by the collective 
ACO. It is not surprising then that 
in the Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration, which was the 
model for the ACA’s Shared 
Savings Program, participating 
organizations focused on reducing 
spending associated with 
management of particular chronic 
diseases, especially congestive heart 
failure, but not on reducing the 
volume of diagnostic and 
therapeutic procedures that are the 
core income and revenue generators 
for important specialist physicians 
and hospitals, including joint 
replacements, spine surgery, cardiac 
procedures, and other procedures 
found in the literature to be 
provided inappropriately.47  
The incentives will actually vary 
based on the structure of the ACO. 
In true multispecialty group 
practices, fee-for-service incentives 
to do more should be moderated 
substantially, even in a shared 
savings payment arrangement based 
on fee-for-service. It depends on the 
method the ACO chooses to 
distribute its global payments. But 
where the providers in the ACO 
essentially receive pass-through fee-
for-service payments, with only 
surpluses against target spending 
amounts subject to the group’s 
distribution formula, it is hard to see 
how the incentives on the individual 
clinician vary much from those of 
fee-for-service. The ultimate effect 
would likely be similar to that with 
bundled episode payment, in which 
cash flow to individual providers 
continues and only the savings are 
considered to be the group’s to 
divide up. In both cases, the 
practical approach of not interfering 
with standard fee-for-service cash 
flow may undermine the objective 
of the new payment approach to 
economize on provision of services. 
Conclusion 
Failing to do whatever we can to 
reduce the use of medically 
inappropriate and unnecessary 
services is indefensible at a time of 
mounting pressures on health 
financing. But experience shows 
that aligning incentives to squeeze 
out waste and improve the 
efficiency of health services 
provision will not be easy. A 
sophisticated and multifaceted 
solution is required.  
To get at inappropriate service use, 
we need to invest in researching 
what works under what 
circumstances and how alternative 
treatment approaches compare to 
one another. That information is 
sorely lacking, due to an 
underinvestment in research that is 
only beginning to be remedied. 
While research on effectiveness will 
always lag behind technology, the 
gap between what providers do and 
what researchers know can be 
bridged, and strategic prioritization 
can identify the most promising 
areas for investment in further 
research. 
But research alone will not suffice. 
There is a need for actors at all 
levels to increase efforts to make 
use of the available evidence. The 
best approaches need to be 
determined, whether they include 
gentle tools, such as establishing 
campaigns to inform providers and 
patients, or stronger yet sometimes 
cruder approaches like incentives to 
use clinical guidelines through 
benefit design and coverage 
decisions, or finer scalpels, such as 
prior authorization rules for certain 
procedures with high rates of 
inappropriate use. New investments 
in electronic health records and 
tools for shared decision-making 
can make information and evidence 
more accessible to providers and 
patients. Where possible, given the 
methodological constraints of 
measuring inappropriate service 
use, we need to amplify use of 
quality measurement and 
monitoring, and we need to increase 
the amount of data given to 
providers that shows their provision 
of overused services relative to their 
peers.  
For many services, particularly 
commonly used and relatively low-
cost services for which prior 
authorization is infeasible, as well 
as for all services of unknown or 
uncertain benefit, administrative 
and policy tools will not suffice and 
could be counter-productive. In 
these cases, the incentives 
established through payment are 
likely to be of critical importance. 
Further, it is likely that the various 
educational efforts and 
administrative approaches will be 
more successful if coupled with 
altered payment incentives.48  
Aligning payment incentives with 
desired outcomes can only help, and 
may in some cases be essential to 
reducing the enormous problem of 
resources squandered through 
wasteful practice decisions. On the 
cusp of important changes in 
payment methodology, policy-
makers need to design payment 
methods in ways that reduce 
incentives for provision of excess 
service volume and maximize 
rewards for provision of beneficial, 
appropriate care. 
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Bundled episodes—A payment approach in which a single payment is made to cover the cost of services delivered by 
multiple providers over a defined period of time to treat a given episode of care (e.g., a knee replacement surgery or a year’s 
worth of diabetes care). 
Episode-based payment—A payment approach in which a single payment is made to cover the cost of services delivered by 
a single provider over a defined period of time to treat a given episode of care. 
Fee-for-service—A payment approach in which health care providers receive a separate fee for each service they deliver. 
Fee schedule—A comprehensive list of fees used by either a private or public health insurance plan or payer to reimburse 
health care providers on a fee-for-services basis. 
Financial risk—When an entity assumes liability for the financial loss that could occur if actual costs exceed expected 
revenues. 
Global capitation—A single payment made to a provider organization to cover the cost of a predefined set of services 
delivered to a patient (e.g., an amount paid per member per month to cover the cost of all of a patient’s health care needs). 
In many cases, the provider organization is responsible for reimbursing other providers for care they deliver to the patient. 
Partial capitation—When a payer pays for some types of services on a capitated basis (e.g., by contracting with a group of 
providers to deliver all of their enrollees’ outpatient care) and pays for other services on a fee-for-service basis (e.g., 
reimbursing any hospital in their network for inpatient care delivered to their enrollees).  
Shared savings—A payment approach whereby a provider or provider organization shares in the savings that accrue to a 
payer when actual spending for a defined population is less than a target amount. (Typically, performance targets on quality 
measures must be met to qualify for shared savings.) If actual costs are higher than projections, there are no financial 
repercussions for providers, unless shared losses are also part of the payment agreement. 
________________________________ 
Adapted from: Delaware Healthcare Association. “Delaware Healthcare Association Glossary of Health Care Terms and Acronyms.” Dover, Del.: 
Delaware Healthcare Association, www.deha.org/Glossary/GlossaryA.htm (accessed December 2012). 
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